从孙子兵法角度审视目标中心战的制胜机制

基于体系对抗的战争特点和我军作战实际情况,提出的目标中心战是现代作战思想的一次凝练及升华。它的制胜机制表现为三个层面：通过选择关键作战目标,提升体系对抗效能;通过影响目标系统功能,谋求局部对抗优势;通过融合体系要素,提高整体对抗能力。     

RAIN,GROWTH, AND CIVIL WAR: THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCATION

We re‐examine the Miguel et al. (2004 Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. and Sergenti, E. 2004. Economic shocks and civil conflict: an instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4): 725–753. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) study of the impact of growth on civil war, using growth in rainfall as an instrument. Miguel et al. (2004 Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. and Sergenti, E. 2004. Economic shocks and civil conflict: an instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4): 725–753. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) – in our view, erroneously – include countries participating in civil wars in other states. Restricting the conflict data to states with conflict on their own territory reduces the estimated impact of economic growth on civil war. We show how spatial correlations in rainfall growth and participation in civil conflicts induce a stronger apparent relationship in the mis‐classified data.     

Territorial contestation and repressive violence in civil war

This study models the structural sources of variation in the use of selective (discriminate) repression within 89 civil wars fought between 1981 and 2005. The severity of repressive violence is modeled as a function of the amount of territory being contested by the insurgents. This idea is operationalized using measures of the location, size, and density of insurgency violence. The analysis finds evidence that the repressive behavior of both governments and rebel groups is linked to conflict geography. Governments violate physical integrity rights more frequently and kill more civilians the greater the overall amount of territory under contestation. Rebels kill more civilians in highly dispersed insurgencies that lack a clear epicenter.     

What Goes Up Must Come Down: Military Expenditure and Civil Wars

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of civil war on military expenditure. We employ two measures of military expenditure: the share of military expenditure in general government expenditure and the logarithm of military expenditures. We would reasonably expect a priori that military expenditure as a share of general government expenditure increases during a civil war and that such increases would taper off over the duration of a civil war. We also explore whether the termination of a civil war induces a decline in the share of military expenditure as a share of the general government expenditure in the short-run. We find evidence the of share of military expenditure increases during a civil war and falls in the year succeeding the end of a civil war, and, in particular, if a war ends in a peace treaty. The level of military expenditures, however, rises during civil wars and does not appear to decline in the short-term after the end of a civil war.     

SOUTH AFRICA'S ANTI-TERROR LAW

This article argues that whereas the waves of democratization which enveloped the continent in the early 1990s following the collapse of Eastern European one-party socialism genera ted expectations of a ‘new dawn’ for ‘good governance’ and sustainable human development on the continent, one wave after another appears to have suffered serious setbacks. Indeed, a decade later, some of the most articulate pro-democracy leaders, who came into office on the crest of the democratic waves of the 1990s have sought to manipulate their countries' constitutions in order to perpetuate their presidential tenure. Such undemocratic behaviour will only fuel speculation in the industrialized world that the New Partnership for Africa's Development is just another decorative blue-print drawn up by beleaguered African despots in order to obtain new resource inflows at a time the international community under the hegemonic leadership of the Uni ted States will be wholly preoccupied with rebuilding post-Saddam Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian roadmap.     

PREVENTIVE ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND THE “SUCCESS” AT OSIRAQ

Advocates of the preventive use of force against emerging nuclear, biological, or chemical programs often look to the allegedly successful 1981 Israeli airstrike against Iraqi nuclear facilities at Osiraq. According to the conventional wisdom, this attack may have prevented Iraq from going nuclear before Operation Desert Storm in 1991. This article assesses the claim that the 1981 attack substantially delayed Iraqi acquisition of nuclear weapons, both by revisiting older debates and by introducing new evidence from Iraqi scientists. The article casts doubt on the conclusion that the attack was successful for three reasons: (1) the reactor itself was not well equipped to generate plutonium for a nuclear weapon; (2) illegal plutonium production would likely have caused a cutoff in the supply of nuclear fuel and an end to weapons activities; and (3) the attack may have actually increased Saddam's commitment to acquiring weapons. These conclusions have implications for the Bush Doctrine, as the lack of success in 1981 casts doubt on the possible success of future attacks against nuclear programs.     

基于复杂网络理论的作战系统结构拓扑模型研究

基于复杂网络理论,分析了信息化作战系统网络结构,构建了传统作战系统和信息化作战系统拓扑模型的生成算法,并通过对传统作战系统和信息化作战系统结构拓扑模型度量性质的比较,说明了信息化战争下的作战系统结构特点,为进一步研究网络化战争提供了良好的模型基础．     

猎击时敏目标的作战机理分析

美军在第二次对伊战争中,以比第一次对伊战争少得多的兵力,更短的准备时间和更少的消耗取得了更大的胜利,对比两次对伊战争中所用的兵器,坦克、主战飞机、战车、轻兵器等主战装备基本还是上次对伊战争的旧兵器,最大的变化是无人机的大量使用,情报系统、战术网络的提升,使战斗能力有极大的提高,这种由系统整合、提升信息化能力、改进指挥控制所产生的作战效能的提升是显著和有效的,代表发展战争潜力的方向。文中以美军对伊战争中主要的作战样式——打击时敏目标为作战想定,建立作战系统猎击时敏目标作战效能模型,对影响作战系统效能的各种因素作定量的分析,揭示作战效能提升的机理。     

Reconciling strategic studies … with itself: a common framework for choosing among strategies

Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for “universal principles of war,” a second, “context-dependent,” approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a “paradoxical logic” school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a “dominate-mix” approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.     

Nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare: coexistence or competition?

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.